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GOVERNING AND MANAGING MULTI-MODAL REGIONAL TRANSIT
AGBNCIBS IN A MULTICBNTRIC BRA

INTRODUCTION

We explore the dynamics of governing and managing multi-modal regional transit agencies
through a case study of the Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District (fri-Met), which
provides bus and rail 1ransit services to the Pordand, Oregon, metropolitan area (see map).
Along with other similarly constituted firms in the United States transit industry, Tri-Met

confronts the challenge of providing service in a geopolitical context that is quite different
than when the agency was created. The critical new element in Tri-Met's operating
environment is the emergence of several suburban business centers that effectively compete
with the Portland central business dis1rict (CBD), and are seeking transit inves1ments that
will facilitate locally-oriented economic growth.
{Figure About Here}

Tri-Met has predominantly supplied journey-to-work bus transit that radiated from
downtown Portland throughout the me1ropolitan area, replicating the service configuration
of the privately-owned companies it purchased in the early 1970s. The agency has
demonstrated its continuing commi1ment to the CBD with a transit mall, as well as a freefare zone for travel within downtown. In 1986 Tri-Met reinforced its downtownorientation with a light rail transit (LRT) line that radiated eastward from the Portland CBD
to a suburban business center 15 miles away. The agency is currently (1988) doing
preliminary engineering for another LRT line radiating from downtown to the west.

However, in recent years Tri-Met has also reconfigured the bus system in porti.ons of its
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domain to more effectively provide service to some suburban business centers, and has
altered its fare structure to boost suburban ridership.

The significance of this spatial complexity of interest in transit lies in both the political
tensions it creates for Tri-Met and in better understanding how transit agencies are limited
in their ability to simply manage efficiently their service delivery. Geopolitical conflict over

the allocation of transit service and the type of service has important consequences for both
the location of service and the ability to manage it. Burke ( 1979) in discussing the general
capacity of transit to innovate obseIVed that the local political context is important in
understanding the "power setting" of transit agencies. Specifically, she suggests:

The power setting of local transit districts....varies enormously from area to area.
In general, there has been a strong alliance between advocates of rail rapid transit

(usually transit suppliers and consultants plus environmental or antihighway

groups) and downtown business interests. To the extent that the transit district
seeks to build a rail system, these are usually their strongest supporters. (p. 29)

Hence, technological and service innovations spatially distribute benefits and costs that tend

to support or confound existing spatial coalitions of interest (Smith 1987; Jones 1985).

An historical perspective on the transit industry is helpful in apprecia1ing the significance of
these alliances. Many of the street railway lines constructed during the heroic period of
industry-building in the early years of the twentieth centwy were built by entrepreneurs
who were primarily interested in profits on the sale and development of land they owned
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along the rail right-of-way. Henry Huntington and his Pacific Electric Railway in the Los
Angeles area, and F. M. "Borrur" Smith and his Key System in the East Bay portion of the
San Francisco Bay Area were two of the leading examples of integrated private sector
transit-land development fmns. When extraordinary construction costs necessitated by
tunneling were involved, as in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, local
government fmanced the lines that would link CBDs with territories newly opened for
settlement (Fogelson 1967; Adler 1980; Cheape 1980).

Transit lines built to facilitate land speculation were never very profitable. Governmental
transit agencies were created to pick up the pieces of these enterprises as they failed, and to
retool them for another round, this 1ime primarily in support of CBD investors confronting
intense suburban competition. The new governmental agencies absorbed the transit access
costs of developing and redeveloping Jand However, Tri-Met's experience indicates that
absorbing transit access costs has reached political, as well as financial limits. Publicprivate par1nerships, which recreate the integrated transit-land development fmn through
the auspices of the governmental agency, represent efforts to transcend these limits.

From an internal management perspective, Fielding (1987) obseives:

Since it cannot control its environment or even change it in any meaningful way,
transit management's best strategy is to come to understand the transit environment
as fully as possible and make use of this knowledge wherever possible. To be

effecti.vc, managers must respond to the demands of individuals and groups.
Because their agencies depend on the support of the communities they serve, transit
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managers must ensure that transit service supports the economic, social, and
environmental goals of these communities. However, transit managers can make
their greatest contribution by being efficient -- that is, by supplying the desired
services for the least amotlllt of resources. To be both effective and efficient,
managers must be ardent s1udents of the social and poli1ical network in which they
work. They need to realize that efficiency is Wlder managemenfs control, whereas
service effectiveness is influenced by many factors in the environment that lie
beyond managemenfs ability to shape or restrain. (p. 7)

Our intent is to show that the geopolitical context of complex metropolitan areas extends not

only to effectiveness issues but also efficiency, requiring management to structure
institutional processes and service delivecy arrangements accordingly. The results of this
analysis will illustrate both the ways in which these impacts are felt in service delivery

decisions and in the extent of impact on institutional and managerial processes of transit
agencies.

We discuss four strategic responses to the new political context that Tri-Met's directors
have pursued: (1) caution; (2) coverage; (3) diversification; and (4) shedding. Tri-Met has
often turned inward, concentrating on internal matters, eschewing ac1ivism on potentially
controversial regional transport issues. The agency has also sought to cover the district
with services in order to generate and sustain widespread support. Tri-Met has also

participated in efforts to distribute rail lines widely, and to design them so as to facilitate
alliances between the CBD and important suburban competitors. Tri-Met directors have
also explored providing suburban transit services that are different than the large vehicle-
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based, fixed route, downtown-radial services the agency has traditionally provided. In
addition, Tri-Met is attempting 1o diversify its sources of finance, entering into publicprivate partnerships of various sons. Finally, Tri-Met has initiated effons to shed some of
its load, and encouraged others to help the agency to shrink. These strategies have often

been tried in combination.

To facilitate and support the analysis, we analyze the creation of the agency, focusing on
the structure of its governing board and its financing powers, in order 1o understand the
consequences of these historical facts for the strategies that have evolved. We examine TriMet's existing investment in LRT and the planning process for future LRT lines, pursuing
the ways in which transport teclmology choices - rail and bus - influence the relationship

between the agency and its environment We also explore how Tri-Met's planning,
management, and budgeting in the new context streng1hen tendencies to jurisdictional
fragmentation. We conclude with a discussion of the relevance of our analysis for the
ways in which transit industry leaders understand the challenges of the multi.centric era and

the choices available to them.

CREATING A GOVBRNMBNTAL TRANSIT AGENCY

In early November, 1968, the management of Rose Cit;y transit shut down the operation for
two days, ignoring a Portland aw Council ultimatum to either run the buses or forfeit its

franchise (Adler 1986). Rose Cit;y was the last remaining privately-owned transit system,
paying the lowest wages, of all major west coast properties. The transit workers had just
rejected a company wage proposal, precipitating the management action. When an
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agreement was reached granting drivers and mechani~ mod.est wage increases, Rose City
readied a fare hike request for the City Council. When the request came in early December,
the Council voted ins1ead to revoke Rose City's franchise in six months and take over the
bus line. The Council reasoned that another fare hike would only exacerbate the~ of
ridership and service decline that had brought Rose City to its then debilitated condition.
Pordand political leaders hoped that municipal ownership would be an interim effort,
giving way to a metropolitan-wide agency in the very near future. Rose Cify''s jurisdiction

was limited to the central cify' and a three-mile band beyond the cify"s boundary.
Suburban-downtown radial service was provided by four small private companies, who
were in similarly poor financial and service condition. Rose Cify' had shown neither
strategic nor financial interest in taking over these smaller suburban Jines and consolidating
them into a regional bus system. Reluctandy, Portland embarked on a~ of creating a
governmental transit agency, aiming at regionaliz,ation as well.

The Portland Qty Council created a Blue Ribbon Qtizens Committee in December, 1968,
to prepare a legislative agenda for the transition from private to public. The proposals

developed for the st.ate legislature by this group, and supported by the City, revealed quite
clearly the City leadership's assessment of suburban political concerns. Anticipating
opposition to its initiative, Portland leaders sought a transition~ and an agency
structure that would minimize suburban participation. Regarding the process of creating a
transit district, the Qzy supported legislation 1hat would enable creation of a district by the

governor. This action would follow receipt of a resolution adopted by the governing body
of the most populous cizy in a metropolitan area finding that area-wide 1ransportation needs
were not being met by existing local transit operations. The governor would then appoint a

seven-member board of directors for the transit district. While the governor would
endeavor to assure equitable board representation for all places in the district, 1he governor
would have full discretion. Regarding finance, a district would have available to it a wide
range of possible tax mechanisms, some of which could be adopted by the board of
directors without a vote of the district electorate.

In opposition to the Portland initiative, a suburban coalition sponsored a legislative
proposal 1hat would enable creation of a multi-purpose regional agency, having sewage and

solid waste, as well as transit responsibilities, rather than the single-purpose transit district
Portland sought Moreover, creation of such a regional agency would have to be approved
by the electorate, along with its tax base. Its board of directors would be appointed by a
convention of locally-elected officials, allocating board seats in a manner that advanced
suburban interests.

Both proposals had grassroots support and the state legislature passed both. The Portland
leadership was concerned that 1he transit issue, the one that was most pressing in their
view, would be submerged in a multi-purpose agency sensitive to suburban growth
aspirations. Seizing the initiative during Fall, 1969, the Qty requested the governor to
create a transit district. The suburban coalition, which planned 1o place a multi-purpose
agency on the ballot the next year, opposed the City action. The governor, however,
created Tri-Met, and appointed its directors, several of whom were members of the former
Portland mue Ribbon Committee.
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In November, 1969, Rose City was locked in struggle with both the Qty of Portland over
the financial dimension of a public takeover, and with the transit workers' union regarding

a new contract. As in 1968, labor-management conflict threatened to disrupt service. TriMet dramatically intervened at this point, requesting a permit from 1he Portland Qty
Council to operate a bus system. The Council granted a permit. The Tri-Met Board then
took up the intensely controversial question of district finance.

Of all 1he mechanisms available to it, Tri-Met chose to implement an employer payroll tax.

Sales taxes were becoming increasingly widespread as a revenue source for governmental
transit operations around the United States. Since Oregon did not levy a sales tax, creating
the administrative machinecy necessaxy to collect this 1ax steered the Tri-Met Board away

from it. The Board also sensed widespread political opposition to the imposition of an
income tax. The only other tax that the Board could impose wi1hout a vot.e of the district
electorate was a 1ax on employer payroDs. Tri-Met pioneered the use of this tax for transit
in this country. Interestingly enough, in 1971 the Paris, France, metropolitan transit
agency adopted a differen1iated employer payroll tax to finance its operations. Indeed, the
Paris approach of~ employers in outlying areas at a lower rat.e than employers in
the central region would have made a great deal of sense in Portland.

The Tri-Met payroll 1ax was bitterly condemned by outlying area business groups as
grossly unfair. More 1han any other mechanism, the employer payroll tax crystallizes
CBD-suburban amflict on the transit question. At a hearing preceding the Board's action,
opponents charged that, "...businesmnen in downtown Portland, not in the suburbs, would
benefit from the me1ropolitan bus system." The Tri-Met Board President had earlier noted
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that he, 0 •••had not received any negative reaction from downtown retailers who will be
paying a big share of the payroll tax.,, (Adler 1986, p. 33)

Wi1hin days, lawsuits were filed by suburban business groups challenging the
constitutionality of the tax, and movements emerged in suburban Clackamas and
Washington Counties to secede from the transit district The rallying cry of the suburban
opponents was: "Taxation without 1ransportation. /1 The roster of outlying businesses
refusing to pay the tax mounted steadily, and referendwn petitions circulated. Tri-Met,
however' successfully resisted an the legal challenges, and was vindicated by the Oregon
Supreme Court during 1he summer of 1970. The petition movement failed to gain the
required number of signatures to place Tri-Met's future on the ballot Recalci1rant

businesses started to pay taxes. Tri-Met quietly moved to take over the private bus
companies and create a unified regional sys1em, composed primarily of downtown-radial

lines.

Given the intense opposition that did, in fact, develop in suburban areas, the strategy

pW'SUed by the downtown Pordand leadership regarding district creation, governing

structure, and finance mechanism was politically astute. The transit movement leadership
sought to insulate decision-making p~ from suburban influence. The district

creation law was written in such a way that only Portland could initiate the process. The
governor would create the district, then appoint the board of directors. Consequently,
suburban aciivists would have difficulty shaping events. Portland was able to do this
because of its relative stnmgth in regional and state political arenas. The choice of a finance

10

mechanism that did not require a vote further insulated the dis1rlct from popular politiG,
and ret1ected the weight of the Portland leadership on the district Board.

The suburban-downtown cont1ict pesent at the creation of Tri-Met, combined with a

finance mechanism that continually highlighted the contl.ict for suburban business and
political leaders, produced a cautious regional agency. Tri-Met busied itself with

modernizing the bus system it inherited, but failed to emerge as an activist agency on behalf
of downtown Portland during its first years. Indeed, Tri-Met very early developed an
image that perfectly reflected the conflict built into its governing and financial s1ructures:
CBD leadem saw it as overly cautious and ineffective as an advocate of downtown-orien.1ed

regional transit; suburban interests saw it as a tool of downtown interests seeking to
maintain the dormitory status of outlying areas.

Early on, Tri-Met learned to wait upon the emergence of a regional consensus regarding

major transport projects, rather than 1o seize the initiative. One oonsequence of its cautious

approach has been that political, business, and technical officials representing the
competing pJaces within the region have defined Tri-Met's agenda. The agency has since

been concerned to defend itself against the cost as wen as politi.cal pressmes 1hat others
might impose on it These pressures reinforce an inward-looking orientation. Widespread

dissatisfaction led the governor to appoint entirely new boards of directors in 1974 and
again in 1977. The process of appointing board members was amended so that the

governor appointed members to serve specified parts of the dis1rlct. However,
gubernatorial appoin1ment oontinued 1o distance board members from constituents,
contributing to the cautiousness displayed by the governing body.
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TRI-MET AND THE BANFIBLD LRT LINE

A crisis in regional transportation planning during the mid-l 970s opened up a window of
opportunity for Tri-Met to emerge as an activist agency (Edner and Arrington, Jr. 1985).
A grass roots opposition movement blocked the construction of an inner city Interstate
freeway. During a planning process designed to reallocate several hundred millions of
dollars previously committed to the now withdrawn freeway, Tri-Met advocated an LRTbased approach rather than the busway rapid transit system that regional transport pJanners

were considering. Consistent with its cautious approach to controversial regional transport
issues, Tri-Mefs primary reason for suggesting LRT was its concern regarding future
operating cmts.

Tri-Met suggested LRT technology as a more cost-effective way of responding to
anticipated increases in service demand than an expansion of its bus system. The agency's
goal was to substitute a smaller number of large capacity railcars, some1imes linked
together in multi.car trains, operated by one driver for the greater number of buses and
drivers that would be required to provide an equivalent amount of paBmger service. Since
wages paid to drivers and to maintenance workers are overwhelmingly the dominant factor
in the cost of producing transit services, this substitution was very attractive to an agency
that was sensitive regarding its financial foundations. With Qty of Portland political and
teclmical officials in the lead, supported by a newly-hired group of rail transit experts at
Tri-Met, a downtown Portland-radial LRT line - the Banfield - emerged as the top priority
project in the region.
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Investments in all forms of transport share one central characteristic: their benefits are
unevenly distributed across space. This creates a~ advantages for some places - those
with stations, stops, and interchanges - while disadvantaging others. There are

differences, however, in the extent to which parti.cular technologies concentrate or disperse
location impacts. A freeway concentrates advantages - around interchanges - to a much
greater extent than a highway that serves property along its en1ire route. Transit vehicles
nmning on guideways concentrate access benefits to a greater extent than vehicles running
in the s1reets. The important guideway charact.er.istics are their fixed nature and the
substantial distance between stations. As in the case of freeway interchanges, these
combine to concentrate ac.cessibility impacts in the vicinity of station locations. Particularly
regarding rail technology, the very high initial cost of the guideway creates an impres&on
of longevity. The tracks are thought to be permanent features of the landscape - in a way
that a fixed route bus is not - conferring place-specific benefits far into the future. It is
important to recall, though, that extensive investments in street running railway systems

were, in fact, abandoned 1hroughout the country.

There is an additional consequence of station spacing, which is exacerbated by the choices
of rail system planners to locate routes and stations along existing freight railroad rights-ofway, and near freeways in order to reduce right-of-way acquisition costs. The
consequence is that in many cases relatively few patrons can walk to train stations. These
l~ ac.cessible stations must,

therefore, be "fed" by buses and by automobiles via park-

and-ri.de lots in order to build and maintain rail system patronage. Designing bus systems
to feed rail stations may have negative financial as well as political consequences for a

transit agency (Bendor 1985; Gomez-Ibanez 1985; Cetvero 1984; Webber 1979).
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Place-based coalitions of political, business, and technical activists seek investments in
transport technologies that will provide growth-facilitating access advantages for their
places. Competition between places, to maintain and attract mobile capital and labor,
politicizes transport investment choices (Adler 1988, 1987; Logan and Molotch 1987;
Peterson 1981 ). Technologies that concentrate benefits in space and across time, as rail
transit and freeway projects do, are always controversial, particularly in me1ropolitan areas

where competition between a CBD and suburban business centers is intense.

A regional consensus around an LIU project that would concentrate benefits in a small
number of places - downtown Portland and a suburban business center at the other end of
the line - was made possible by the availabiliey of withdrawal monies to support highway
projects aimed at facilitating locally-oriented economic growth elsewhere in the region. The
need to create and maintain a regional consensus in order to secure federal government
monies sheltered Tri-Met, producing a political environment conducive to the adoption of
rail technology. Tri-Met also moved to offset the concentration of rail project benefits by

embarking on a program of expanding bus service throughout the region, particularly
downtown-radial suburban routes. These services were partly financed with operating
subsidies the federal government had recently begun to make available. The regional
consensus supported adoption of these bus service extensions as well.
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TRI-MBT AND WESTSIDE LRT PLANNING: PART ONE

When the federal government finally committed funds to build the Banfield LRT line,
regional 1ransport planners tmned their attention to the next LRT project. Tri-Met joined
seven other local governments and the state transporta1ion department in an agreement on a
westsi.de LRT line as the region's next priority project. The Banfield line reflected an
alliance of downtown Portland activists and their counterparts in the suburban city of
Gresham, in the eastern part of the metropolitan area The wes1side line reflected an effort
to create a similar alliance between downtown Portland and political, business, and
technical leaders in the eastern Washington County City of Beaverton. As in the case of the
Banfield line, wes1side LRT would parallel existing freeway and rail freight rights-of-way
for much of its length. The proposed line would not extend, however, into the west.em
portion of the County, where a great deal of investment in high-technology electronic plants

had recently taken place.

Agreement on a westside LRT alignment was reached in 1983, however, Tri-Met hesitated

to apply for federal funds to begin preliminary engineering on this project During 1985 its
hesitation began to attract cri1icism. Tri-Met was deeply involved in building the Banfield
LRf line at this point in time. Moreover, the agency was suffering fmancially as a result of
the recession of the early 1980s. The recession hit Oregon especially hard, pushing
unemployment rates well above the national average. With its financing 1ied to payrolls,
Tri-Met experienced sharp declines in revenues as well in patronage. Following a period of

growth in the latter 1970s, facilitated by operating subsidies provided by the federal
government, during the early and mid- l 980s Tri-Met was forced into a series of painful
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service cuts and fare increases. Tri-Met claimed that its debilitated financial condition
prevented it from ooming up with sufficient LRT planning funds to match a federal
planning con1nbuti.on.

In addition to i1s financial and construction preoccupations, though, Tri-Met hesitated to
begin westside LRT planning because opposition to the project had surfaced in the western

portion of Washington County. The opposition reflected the increasing political as well as
economic strength of this part of the metropolitan area, which is home to many of the
region's high-technology electronics firms. At the same time, land use and economic
development planners in Clackamas County joined with planners at the Port of Portland to

propose an LRT line running south from Portland International Airport, through a
connection with the Banfield line, to a major regional shopping center south and east of
downtown. This proposed LRT line would follow the route of a recen1ly constructed
circumferential freeway for most of i1s leng1h.

Tri-Met was aware of the western Washington County opposition. The agency's lobbyist
and public affairs direcior noted the basis for their position: "I think they are concerned that
an increased transit presence in the area will mean higher payroll taxes for them."
(Fedennan, 1985) Moreover, high-tech executives opposed LRT because they thought it
would be an expensive failure. A reporter for the Hillsboro Argus, the leading newspaper
in western Washington County, based in the County seat, went on to explain that the Tri-

Met official knew that, "...the Argus and a lot of western Washington County
businessmen have a long-standing grudge against Tri-Met because of its payroll-tax method
of financing a large portion of its operations. The reason, of course, is that local
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merchan1s, by being forced to pay the payroll tax, in effect are paying to send their own
potential customers to Portland to do their shopping.n (Jensen 1985)

The Argus editorialized an historlcal perspective on the issue which captured the essence of
Trl-Mefs changed geopolitical environment "ln. ..earlier years, Hillsboro was viewed by

the larger city (Portland) as a 'bedroom community,' which provided workers for
Pordand's indus1rles. That situation had a great deal to do with the development of Tri-Met
as a payroll-tax supported regional 1ransit agency, designed to take workers and shoppers
from outlying 'bedroom' areas into Portland. Since the late 1970s, however, industrial
development in Hillsboro and the Sunset Corridor has tended to tum 1hat situation arotmd"
(Argus February 7, 1985) A 1ii-Met Board member from Washington County noted as

well that westside LRT did not have much support among his westside business contacts.
They were more favorably disposed to a locally-oriented flexible bus system.

Washington County transport activists, particularly those in the west, were shifting their
focus away from LRT to a north-south circumferential highway that they saw as more
effectively serving their economic growth aspirations. Applauding this shift, the Argus
editorialized, n •••we would far rather see•..money•••spent to faciitate north-south 1raffic in

Washingk>n Cowiey- -where it is urgently needed - rather than boosting 1ravel from our
County into downtown Portland." (Argus March 12, 1985)

These developments - opposition to wes1side LRT and support for the Bypass highway in
Washington Counfy', and support for the Interstate 205 LRT line in CJackamas County -
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1hreatened to disrupt the fragile regional transport consensus that had protecied Thi-Met
since the mid-1970s, reinforcing the cautious behavior of Tri-Met.

TRI-MET AND WESTSIDE LRT PLANNING: PART TWO

Portland transit activists started to urge Tri-Met forward on westside LRT planning once
again in 1987. Faced with worsening traffic congestion on the Sunset Highway leading

into downtown from Washington Counfy', the Portland Qey Council reaffirmed its
commitment to a wes1side LR'f line as the region top priority transport project The state
department of transpm1ation urged 1ii-Met to begin preliminary engineering on the LRT

line as well, so that highway studies in this corridor oould be done with the rail line in
mind. This time Tri-Met was a willing participant

The difference between 1985 and 1987 was the successful opening of the Banfield LRT
line in September, 1986. On-time and under budget, Thi-Met's Mettopolitan Area Express

(MAX) boosted the agency's morale and i1s standing within the region. The success of

MAX - which cost about $200 miBion - owed a great deal to organizational changes Tri-

Met instituted in advance of opening day. In addition, Trl.-Met also 1rled to create more
realistic patronage expectations for MAX than the forecas1s that had been done in the 1970s
to justify the project.

The original forecas1s done as part of the Banfield LRf planning process, prepared during

a period when the regional eoonomy and 1ransit ridership were growing, projected in
e~

of 40,000 riders per day. In the months before startup, Tri-Met dramatically

19
I

I

I

lowered its expectations to a pessimistic 10,000 per day, reflecting the recession-related
ridership declines the agency had recently experienced. When first year patronage
s1abilized at about 19,000 riders per day, Tri-Met proudly talked about ridership exceeding

expectations.

Wlthin the organization Tri-Met chose to approach rail-related labor issues in a pOOtive way
so as to smooth the introduction of the new technology. Labor relations at Tri-Met. as at
many other transit firms in the United States, had been especially biUer in recent years. In
response to declining financial fortunes, transit managements have sought to reduce
operating costs by introducing new work practices and m-introducing other longabandoned practices, including contracting out functions to private sector firms, hiring parttime workers, and increasing the pmportion of split shifts. Transit workers have
vigorously resisted these efforts.

Tri-Mefs financial difficulties during the early 1980s had produced quite substantial cuts in
service and employment, exacerbating labor-management conflict. Given the deeply

1roubled st.ate of bus-related labor relations, Tri-Met chose to work with its employees,
rather than against them. Agency management decided to train its bus system workers to

operate, and, more signif1Calltly, to maintain the rail system, rather than try to replace inhouse personnel with skilled workers hired from ou1side. In this way, management
integrated transit workers into the innovation process, thereby securing their cooperation
and commi1ment to the success of the project. The indications are that morale at Tri-Met
~ improved dramatically since the trains started rolling.

serious management concern, has signifiamtly declined.
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Absenteeism, previously a

Tri-Met a1so moved to reconfigure its bus network in relation to the lRT line, creating a
grid sys1em in the LRT service area. Tri-Met hired a transit planner who specialized in

designing and implementing grid systems. Some exis1ing radial bus routes within the
central city were reconfigured, emerging as crosstown lines centered on future LRT
stations. In the outlying eastern porti.on of the metropolitan area, radial bus lines that
would oompete with LRT were rerouted to feed LRT stations. These bus system changes
were put in place well in advance of the scheduled starting date.

Finally, Tri-Met chose to deal with the adoption of the new t.echnology by integrating it
within its current organizational sttucture. Rather than develop a separate rail division,

which might create internal dimension, the agency created a joint rail/bus operating division
and oompanion maintenance division, effectively tying the two technologies toge1her. This
supported the CJ.lm-training efforts aimed at maintaining labor support as well as facilitated

coordinated servicing. While bus operators must take special training to operate MAX,
personnel can, after training, move freely between t.echnologies, limited only by seniori1ybased shift bidding rights.

The success of MAX and an up1um in the regional eoonomy stabilized Tri-Mets financial
situation, as well as its organizational stature. The agency was ready in l 9Pr/ to secure
federal funds to begin preliminary engineerhtg on the wes1side LRT line agreed to in 1983.
However, western Washington County opponents who had been active in 1985 surfaced
once again. In addition, suburban Oackamas County leaders complicated matters by
strongly advocating the rail line they had begun studying in 1985.
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An Argus editorial returned to the themes previously developed by the paper:

Every time planners zero-in on Washington County transportation needs, the topic
seems to st.art and end with emphasis on a need for a transit system to better serve
downtown Portland....What about intra-area services of Hillsboro, Aloha and

Beaverton....There is a need for future planning to make a tie between the industrial
plants in the northern end of Washington County with the retailing outlets and the
expanding county residential neighborhoods - not with downtown Portland....
Planners need to put more service from Washington County to downtown Portland
on the back burner and place the emphasis where the people of Washington County
are living and business is growing. This is within the county and not in downtown
Portland. (Argus January 7, 1988
)

The mayor of Beaverton countered the opposition from the western part of the County with
the suggestion that perhaps the westside LRT line ought to continue south rather than tum

west wi1hin the County. The suburban Qty of Tigard, located south of Beaverton,
expressed interest, reflecting its own ambitious downtown revitalization efforts.

During the course of preliminary engineering, Tri-Met was reluctantly forced to conclude
that the alignment adopted in 1983 for the portion of the line west of Beaverton was no
longer acceptable. A new set of alternative alignments would have to be studied Unlike
the 1983 routing, all of the new candidates extended to Hillsboro in the west. What
disturbed Tri-Met most about the troubling alignment discovecy was the prospect of having
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to reconstruct the official regional political alliance that had supported as well as shielded

the agency for the past several years.

While controversy flared regarding wes1side LRT, the Oackamas County Department of
Transporta.1ion and Development and County political officials were wri1ing papers and

making statements asserting the autonomous nature of the County's economic growth, its
need for LRT to facilitate the County's development, and 1he logic of placing its Interstate205 LRT project quite high on the regional transport agenda. These political and technical
activis1s pointed to the much lower cost estimate for the 1-205 rail line as compared with

westsi.de LRT, and the relative speed with which their rail line could be built. They had
plans for another Clackamas County LRT line as well.

Clackamas County's assertiven~ troubled Washington Collllty officials. The chairperson
of the Washington County Board of Connnisfiloners said she thought Cackamas County
officials no longer believed that the westside LRT line was and ought to be the regions's
number one transport priority. She 1hought that adding LRT lines to the regional list would
threaten funding for the top priority: "You can't do a little part of everything, or nothing

gets done.• (Green 1988) A Clackamas County Commissioner responded that he was,
" •••shocked and appalled. .. " (Kohler 1988) by the accusation that his County was
attempting to undermine the regional amsensus. Qackamas technical and political officials

affirmed their allegiance to westsi.de LRr as the number one regional priority. They argued
there would not be competition between the two projects because different funding sources

would likely be involved. They wanted 1D make sure, however, 1hat their project was
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number two on the list, even as technical officials argued the attractiveness of the 1-205
project in comparison with the westside.

Tri-Met responses to these developments display the coverage strategy in action. By
extending the westside LRT line to Hillsboro, the agency was attempting to induce western
Washington County business centers into an alliance with downtown Portland and
downtown Beaverton. A Tri-Met Board member articulated the agency's approach to
Clackamas County when he noted that more than one additional LRT line ought to be

included in regional transport plans in order to generate more support throughout the
metropolitan area: uThinldng small probably means success would be small. u (Bodine
1987)

The coverage strategy clearly has limits, though, related primarily to cost. Covering the

region with rail lines, even LRT lines utilizing freeway and rail freight rights-of-way, is
estimated to cost more than $600 million. In an era of diminishing federal government

fimding for rail transit capital projects, this implies substantial state, regional, and private
sector financial commitments. These commitments, in turn, would have to rest on a
regional political consensus, particularly regarding priorities, as firm as the one that
supported MAX. Another limit of the coverage strategy is visible in Tri-Mefs concern reflecting its cautious side - with the cost of operating and maintaining the LRT lines.

Consensus is required to fund these costs as well. Tri-Met has consistently backed or been

forced away from imposing its own new taxes, most recently deciding against imposing a
regional income tax. The directors have also declined to lead efforts seeking other state and
local SOUtceS of finance.
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THE SUBURBAN TURN: DIVERSIFICATION ONE

Tri-Met began divel'Sifying the configuration of its bus service in the latter 1970s, even
before it redesigned its bus network to accommodate MAX. In 1979 Tri-Met opened two
timed-transfer suburban transit centers in Washington County. In 1988 two more were
opened there, one of which was in Hillsboro. The Hillsboro center will be the focus of
transit in western Washington County. These centers were designed to respond to 1he
suburban interest in locally-oriented transit service. In addition to facilitating transfers to
downtown Portland radial buses, the local services radiating from these centers permit
suburban business places to penetrate their residential hinterlands as well.

Diversifying the structure of bus service in this way closely links this strategy with the
coverage approach discussed in the rail context. A suburban transit center creates the
possibility of an alliance based on peaceful coexistence, permitting, for example, Hillsboro
and downtown Portland to contest for western Washington County residents, just as a rail
station located in downtown Beaverton would permit The growth aspirations of both
places would be legitimated and facilitated.

However, the design requirements of the LRf lines that would cover the region may come
into conflict with efforts to expand locally-oriented bus service via suburban transit centers.
These stations require large park-and-ride lots and feeder bus service in order to build LRT
patronage. These feeder services, which usually require substantial subsidies, may drain
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resources away from local service oriented to suburban transit centers. The rail coverage
strategy, therefore, may undermine a bus-based diversification approach.

Tri-Met is a1so studying more dramatic ways of diversifying its suburban services,
focusing on paratransit possibilities. This study effort has been editorially applauded by
the downtown Portland-oriented major metropolitan daily, The Oregonian. The editors
explicitly linked western Washington County support for westside LRT to responsiveness
regarding altema1ives to downtown-radial service:
Suburban resistance to such projects as west-side light rail stems largely from
businesses that doubt they get their money's worth while the benefits go to
downtown competitors. Th.us, completion of transit plans for suburban areas holds
the promise of winning broader regional support for development of the
metropolitan area.... [S)ome grumbling on the outskirts about a system that does not
address specific local transportation needs is understandable.... A radial system to
and from the core does not answer, for instance, a Tigard residenfs question of
how to get to Hillsboro without driving a car. So Tri-Mefs study to establish the
level of need for travel within suburban communities and methods of meeting it
holds promise of roundmg out a transit system. Support of nearby industry ought
to follow. (The Oregonian April 4, 1988)

A diversified version of a coverage strategy is financially problematic, however,
particularly if locally-oriented suburban service is provided using big buses, driven by
unionized drivers, and running on fixed routes. The costs of implementing a diversified

service strategy have intensified interest in con1racting out the provision of these alternative
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services, as well as other aspects of Tri-Met's operation, to private sector firms (feat
1988).

Tri-Met's citizen advisocy committee told the agency that,

0

•••

contracting out, constrained

by the current labor agreement, continues to show excellent cost savings potential... 0
(Federman 1988c) especially for services in outlying areas. The Oregonian editorially
called for public support for Tri-Met management efforts to negotiate rights to con1rac1ing,

noting that, "It would. ..allow contracting with private companies for bus seivice in
outlying areas, which Tri-Met has backed away from because of high cos1s." (The
Oregonian April 27, 1988) Tri-Met's management and the Amalgamated Transit Union,

representing the agency's drivers and mechanics, both acknowledge that, 0 ••• contracting
out will probably take precedence over all other (ismes] at the bargaining table." Tri-Met's
general manager argues that, "If this agency is to survive in the years ahead, we must have
the ability to contract out certain services...in outlying areas when a private carrier could
provide such services a lot cheaper." (Federman l 988d) Tue union has made it clear that it

will fight any effort to include contracting out in the next labor agreement.

Implementing a fully formed diversified service strategy will involve bitter conflict with
transit labor. In the meantime, in addition to the initial implementation of this strategy, Tri.-

Met has altered its fare structure so as to induce submban riders, many of whom stopped
riding when fare increases and service cuts were instituted in the early and mid-1980s, to
start riding again. An important factor motivating the fare restructuring was growing
criticism regarding "Fareless Square" in downtown Portland. The Oregonian's transit
reporter not.ed that Fareless Square critics were mostly to be found in, ,, ...outlying business
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communities who do not have a free-ride system in their areas. They say their Tri-Met
payroll taxes help pay for a system that benefits only downtown Portland" (Federman
l 988a) Tri-Met wanted to retain Fareless Square, but did not want to cover the region with
free fare zones. The agency responded with a reduciion in suburban cash fares and
monthly pass prices, and by shrinking its former five zone system to three zones. The fare
for the longest transit 1rlp would decline from $1.35 to $1.15, and the cost of an all-zone
monthly pass would decline from $44 to $37. Transit analysts, particularly in the
academy, have long been loudly advocating a distance-based fare strucinre as both a more
efficient as well as a more equitable way to price transit services (Cervero 1982). Tri-Met's
five zone system had placed the agency wi1hin a select circle of properties that had heeded
this call. Downzoning as a way of responding to suburban concerns will likely make the
achievement of these objectives more difficult However, the chairman of Meier and
Frank, Portland's leading department store, said, " ...the city's business community
appreciated the retention of Fareless Square and that such action 'showed that Tri-Met had

committed itself toward maintaining a healthy downtown business area.'" (Federman
1988b)

Tri-Met was willing to respond to suburban concerns with a revised fare structure,
however, the agency's five year transit development plan for the period ending 1992
reflected caution. ''The Plan seeks to increase ridership in Tri-Met's present markets. New
markets, particularly those in the difficuh-to-serve suburban areas, will be seriously
studied. But the Plan does not envision significant service expansion or redeployment of
traditional transit resources in new geographic areas." (Tri-Met 1987) New and expanded
suburban services would be contingent on Tri-Met's ability to contract out for them. With
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an eye toward escalating demands for building and operating LRT lines, the agency would
explore public-private partnerships, as well as state and local government sources of
revenues. Tri-Met pledged not to impose any new taxes during the a>nrlng five years, nor
would it make any service cuts. Fmancial stability was the Plan's chief objective.

Tri-Met anticipated that, "This Plan will, no doubt, seem modest to those who wish for
transit expansion to match, if not exceed, regional growth. 0 (Tri-Met 1987) The agency
was right The Oregonian editorialized that the 0 •• • no new revenue ...no growth... " Plan
represented an abdication of leadership on the part of the Tri-Met Board and the
management in the face of air quality and economic development challenges. The editors
resorted to apocalyptic language reminiscent of the 1940s and 1950s in describing the
consequences of a failure to expand transit "New businesses might turn away from a
community that is choking on its unsolved traffic problems....main-street congestion and
intersection gridlock." (The Oregonian November 14, 87) The region's Joint Policy
Advisory Committee on Transportation, the group responsible for articulating the regional
consensus on transport questions, approved the Plan's objective of establishing a firm
financial foundation for the 1ransit agency. However, the Committee a1so emphasized its
continuing interest in expanding both bus service and LRT, and its expectation that Tri-Met
would play an appropriate role in the expansion p~.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: DIVERSIFICATION TWO

Tri-Met estimates that MAX requires a local tax subsidy of approximately $2.8 million. In
an effort to eliminate this subsidy, Tri-Met is set to enter the land development business in
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par1nership with hotel and shopping center developers. A hotel would be built near the
Oregon Convention Center that is currently under construction in Portland and is served by

MAX. The shopping center is planned for a site near the end of the MAX line in suburban
Gresham. Project Break-Even, spearheaded by a Portland City C.Ouncil member, recently
received its first funding instalbnentfrom the United States Congress. The grant will
permit Tri-Met to begin purchasing land for lease to private developers, and to build LRT

stations on the Banfield line in conjunction with those projects. The Urban Mass
Transportation Administration has estimated that the combination of lease revenues and
revenues from additional ridership generat.ed by the hotel and shopping center projects
would be sufficient to offset the local tax subsidy to MAX.

The shopping center project has generated oontroversy, including opposition from the
regional shopping mall located closest to Gresham. 'Iii-Met, as well as local and federal

elected officia1s, have offered assurances to Gresham residents and business and political
leaders that local land use planning objectives and processes will determine the future of the
project The Portland City Council member leading 1his effort disagreed that the suburban
project would oompete with downtown Portland, and would, therefore, be opposed by
CBD business groups. He justified his support of the initiative with the argument that,
"We cannot afford to look at the regional rail system as pitting downtown Portland against
Gresham.... [E]ven though my responsibilities are in the city of Portland, I am convinced I
am serving the citizens of Portland best if we have a regional ttansi.t system. /1 (Church
1988)
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This seems a poti.1ically astute approach to financing a signifiamt portion of the rail
coverage strategy. Joint venture projeds located at key rail stations would also facilitate
alliances between downtown Portland and suburban businem centers. Ventures of 1he sort
that Tri-Met is embarking on in Gresham were strongly recommended by a Public-Private

Task Force on Transit Financing, co-chaired by a Tri-Met board member and 1he Portland
City Council member quoted above. Joint venture-related revenues oould also lessen

pressures to reduce bus service, and to impose new taxes that would be politically
destabilizing for Tri-Met.

SHRINKING TO FIT AND DISAPPEARING?

Shortly after MAX started running, a state legislator in.1roduced a bill to pennit communities
to secede from the Tri-Met district. The proposed law was in response to oompJaints from
business and political leaders in several outlying areas. One Qty Council member in a
suburban cify' pointed out 1hat, ".. .merchants were unhappy about being forced to pay a
payroll tax to finance bus service that transports potential customers to other shopping
areas." (The Oregoni.an Janaury 11, 1988) Other similarly situated secessionists revived

the "taxation without transportation" protest of the Tri-Met creation period. Business and
political leaders in these places argued that they paid out far more in payroll taxes than 1hey
received in bus service. The subsidy requirements of MAX, and other LRT lines yet to
come, likely revived the smoldering resentment felt in those oudying areas without a
prospect of inclusion in either a rail ooverage or suburban 1ransit center regional strategy.
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Tri-Met supported the secession law, which passed the legislature easily. Indeed, a former
Tri-Met Board president had himself advocated planned slninkage as a way of cutting
financial losses before the movement took shape. Shortly after st.ate legislative passage,

seven cities on the fringes of the dis1rict began exploring wi1hdrawal. Tri-Met staff has
recommended that the formal requests of three of these seven to secede be approved by the
District Board.

Tri-Met has also sought to facili1ate slninkage by privatizing bus routes that it abandons.
The agency has tried to a secure a grant from the federal government to subsidize private
operators serving two of its former routes. Tri-Met helped the private firms - a bus
company and a taxicab outfit - to establish service. However, union opposition to
privatization has, thus far, blocked the subsidy effort The union stance on subsidizing
private providers is similar to its vehement opposition to contracting out.

Shrinking clearly has strategic at1rac1ions for financially and politically insecure Tri-Met.
However, slninking will likely complicate the process of regional amsensus building,
particularly for large-scale projects involving down1own Portland. In addition, shrinking is
conceptually a short step - though practiailly a long one - from disappearing Trl-Met, in its
CWTentform, entirely.

Two modes of disappearing the transit agency have resurfaced during the course of
wes1side LRT planning. One is to change the Tri-Met Board of Directors from a body

appointed by the governor to one that is directly elected by dis1rict within the region. The
other is to have the Metropolitan Service Distdct (Metro) take over Tri-Met Metro covers
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pretty much the same territory as Tri-Met, has a governing council directly elected by
district, and is currently responsible for solid waste disposal, the zoo, and building the
convention center. Created in 1978, Metro is the regional government agency suburban
coali1ions wanted to see in 1970 as an alternative to the single purpme Tri-Met transit
dis1rict. Metro supporters expected that at some point in the not-too-distant future Metro

would, indeed, take over transit responsibilities from Tri-Met. However, complex legal,
financial, and political problems, having mostly to do with the status of bonds Tri-Met sold

to purchase Rose Qty and the other private finns, have thus far complicated folding Trl-

Met into Metro.

A council member in the Washington Collll1¥ suburb of Sherwood - a place that would not
be served by a proposed LRT line - argued that it was time to change 1he structure of transit

government in the region because, "The Tri-Met board appointed by the governor
represents special interests and relates more to the (1ransporta1ion) needs of downtown
Portland 1hananywhere else." This suburbanofficialfeltthatTri-Methad, "...failed to
recognize that the big challenge is in moving people around Washington County
.... Historically, the focus of mass transit has been on downtown Portland...But it's
obvious...that transportation needs have changed dramatically...and Tri-Met has not
addr~ these needs."

The westside LRT project had crystallized these concerns for this

council member. the project would serve some of the needs of suburban residents, but it
still was,

0
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oriented to moving people to and from Portland." (Spielmann 1988) The

council member felt that the only way to force attention to intra-county transit needs was to
have an elected board member directly confront constituency pressure. A state legislative
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Task Force on Metropolitan Regional Government has been given the assignment of
reviewing mass transit.

An elected board of directors, whether of a multi-purpose or a single-purpose agency,
would still have to confront the challenge which we noted at the beginning of this chapter:
providing transit service to a multicentric metropolitan area. The bus-related requirements
of rail t.ecbnology, combined with the concentration of rail system benefits in space and
over time, will also continue to complicate the process of regional consensus building.
However, elected directors, with constituencies of their own, may be in a position to play a
more active leadership role on transit questions - if and when they are able to formulate a
consensus - than Tri-Met has historically been able to do.

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Competition between the cen1ral business district and suburban business centers is a
geopolitical fact that metropolitan Portland has in common with many other metropolitan
areas in the United States. Tri-Met's strategic responses to this contextual feature are likely
to be present or evolving elsewhere as well. The agency's experience indicates the

difficulties involved in attempting to be both efficient and effective, as Helding urged. In
theory, managers may be able to make their greatest contribution by being efficient

However, being effective - responding to constituent community demands in a geopolitical
context of intense competition between places - presents serious obstacles to efficiently
managing that which Fielding argues is under management's control.
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Tri-Met has been in the region since its creation, but in an important sense it has not been
of the Portland metropolitan area. The agency's ambiguous status, reflecting the spatial
competition present when Rose City Transit went through its final death throes, produced a
cautious streak in Tri-Met's directors and managers, particularly concerning new sources of
local public finance. However, caution has not produced political st.ability. Increasingly
~ve competing places have pushed for more downtown/radial service and pulled for

more suburban accessibility, and have been either hosfile, suspicious, or disappointed with
Tri-Met's responses. Dissa1isfac1ion has, in tum, engendered a great deal of turnover on
the board of directors, continuing interest in dramatically res1ructuring the agency, and a
secession movement.

Tri-Met's experience with the coverage and diversifications strategies illuminates the
conflicting design, service, and fare imperatives of responding to the demands of a
multicentric environment Covering the region with rail lines responds to the downtown
demand for increased reception capacity. Under certain circumstances, rail may increase
operating efficiency as it sumututes capital for labor. However, planning and designing
rail lines so as to minimize right-of-way acquisition and related costs reduces the
possibilities of creating alliances in support of rail projects. It also makes it financially
difficult to both reconfigure bus networks to feed rail stations and to diversify into covering
the region with bus service oriented to submban business centers. In addition, covering
the region with rail lines is an extremely expensive strategy, hnplementation of which is

more difficult given declining leve1s of federal government financial support. Private
sources of rail project finance, therefore, emerge as a way of lessening the pressure that
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downtown-suburban alliances would place on the transit agency's ever-fragile regional
political support.

Financial constraints also induce agency interest in contracting out as a way of responding
to suburban business center demands, as well as in planned shrinkage, both of which
would increase operating efficiency. In the short-run, however, Tri-Met's suburban tum
has resulted in a fare reduction for suburban riders, which compromises both efficiency

and equity. Moreover, since the fare reduction primarily benefits dowtown Portland and
downtown. commuters, it is unlikely to generate much support for the agency from
suburban business center activists.

Tri-Met's history and the elements of its future that are presently visible indicate that the
regional government agencies that emerged from the ashes of the privately-owned transit
companies will be profoundly transformed in a multlcentric metropolitan context. Spatial
competition produces tendencies to disaggregation, which are reinforced by the
differingtechnical/design requirements of downtown- and suburban-oriented transit.
Private sources of project finance and private sources of service delivery, targeted to the
demands of particular place competitors, emerge as structural elements suited to the new
geopolitical context. Disaggregation will exacerbate the already intense pressures bearing
on organized transit labor. The wage gains, protections, and work rules secured by labor
during the transition from a private to a governmental industry, and advanced when

subsidies were plentiful constitute barriers to hnplementing the new elements. Creating the
political consensus necessary to plan and implement major transport projects will be
increasingly difficult. The decline in extra-regional sources of funds, however, heightens
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the role 1hat regional political institutions will have to play in order to develop consensus on
major new initiatives.
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